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Privacy Risks from Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons
Suyash S. Shringarpure1,* and Carlos D. Bustamante1,*
The human genetics community needs robust protocols that enable secure sharing of genomic data fromparticipants in genetic research.
Beacons are web servers that answer allele-presence queries—such as ‘‘Do you have a genome that has a specific nucleotide (e.g., A) at a
specific genomic position (e.g., position 11,272 on chromosome 1)?’’—with either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ Here, we show that individuals in a bea-
con are susceptible to re-identification even if the only data shared include presence or absence information about alleles in a beacon. Spe-
cifically, we propose a likelihood-ratio test of whether a given individual is present in a given genetic beacon.Our test is not dependent on
allele frequencies and is the most powerful test for a specified false-positive rate. Through simulations, we showed that in a beacon with
1,000 individuals, re-identification is possible with just 5,000 queries. Relatives can also be identified in the beacon. Re-identification is
possible even in the presence of sequencing errors and variant-calling differences. In a beacon constructed with 65 European individuals
from the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrated that it is possible to detect membership in the beacon with just 250 SNPs. With just
1,000 SNP queries, we were able to detect the presence of an individual genome from the Personal Genome Project in an existing beacon.
Our results show that beacons can disclose membership and implied phenotypic information about participants and do not protect pri-
vacy a priori. We discuss risk mitigation through policies and standards such as not allowing anonymous pings of genetic beacons and
requiring minimum beacon sizes.Introduction
In the coming decade, a great deal of human genomic data,
along with linked phenotypes in electronic health records,
will be collected in the context of health care. A major goal
of the human genomics community is to enable efficient
sharing, aggregation, and analysis of these data in order
to understand the genetic contributors of health and dis-
ease. Previous large-scale data-sharing approaches have
had limited success because of the potential for privacy
breaches and risks of participant re-identification. Homer
et al.1 and others2–5 showed that subjects in a genome-
wide association study could be re-identified with the use
of allele frequencies, resulting in the removal of publicly
available allele-frequency data.6
TheBeaconProject by theGlobalAlliance forGenomics&
Health (GA4GH) aims to simplify data sharing through a
web service (‘‘beacon’’) that provides only allele-presence
information. Users can query institutional beacons for in-
formation about genomic data available at the institution.
Queries are of the form ‘‘Do you have a genome that has a
specific nucleotide (e.g., A) at a specific genomic position
(e.g., position 11,272 on chromosome 1)?’’ and the beacon
server can answer ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ Beacons are intended to
be easily set up and to allow data sharing while protecting
participant privacy. By providing only allele-presence infor-
mation, beacons are safe from attacks that require allele fre-
quencies.1–5However, aprivacybreach fromabeaconwould
be troublinggiven thatbeaconsoften summarizedatawitha
particular disease of interest. For instance, identifying that a
given genome is part of the SFARI beacon, which contains
genomic data from families with a child affected by autism
spectrum disorder, means that the individual belongs to a1Department of Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
*Correspondence: suyashs@stanford.edu (S.S.S.), cdbustam@stanford.edu (C.D
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajhg.2015.09.010. 2015 The Authors
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative
The Americanfamily where some member has autism spectrum disorder.
Thus, beacons could leaknot onlymembership information
but also phenotype information. Although genetic privacy
is protected to some extent by the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the offered protections are
limited, and GINA does not apply to long-term care insur-
ance, life insurance, disability insurance, or other special
cases.7 Therefore, all data-sharing mechanisms, including
beacons, must protect participant privacy.
To examine the question of re-identification in a beacon,
we have developed a likelihood-ratio test (LRT) that uses
allele presence or absence responses from a beacon to pre-
dict whether a given individual genome is present in the
beacon database. Our approach is independent of allele fre-
quencies. The statistical properties of the LRT guarantee
that it is the most powerful test for this problem. A varia-
tion of our LRT can detect relatives of the query individual
in the beacon. Our results suggest that anonymous-access
beacons do not protect individual privacy and are open
to re-identification attacks. As a result, they can also
disclose phenotype information about individuals whose
genomes are present in the beacon.Material and Methods
We assume a beacon composed of unrelated individuals from a
single population. Given query q ¼ {C, P, A}, the beacon answers
‘‘yes’’ (represented as 1) if allele A is an alternate allele at position
P on chromosome C and has a non-zero frequency in the sample
used for constructing the beacon, and it answers ‘‘no’’ (represented
as 0) otherwise. We consider only bi-allelic SNPs for our analysis.
Thus, given a set of n queriesQ¼ {q1,., qn}, the beacon returns a
set of responses R ¼ {x1, ., xn}. For our scenario, we assume that.B.)
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the attacker has access to more information—the number of indi-
viduals (N) in the beacon database and the site frequency spectrum
(SFS) of the population in the beacon—parameterized as a beta dis-
tribution with shape parameters (a0, b0). Thus, we assume that
alternate allele frequencies f for all SNPs observed in the popula-
tion are distributed as f ~ beta(a0, b0).
For our attack scenario, we assume a setting identical to that
used by Homer et al.1 and others. In this setting, the attacker re-
ceives a VCF file listing all the SNP positions at which the query
individual has an alternate allele and the genotype calls at the cor-
responding positions. The attacker then queries the beacon for all
heterozygous positions by using the alternate allele listed in the
VCF and obtains the set of responses R from the beacon. We
develop a LRT that can use the responses R to decide whether
the query genome is in the beacon.
If the query individual is present in the beacon, then every
allele in the query genome must be present in the beacon.
Thus, the beacon will return a ‘‘yes’’ (1) response to every query.
If a query individual is not present in the beacon, then the beacon
response will be ‘‘yes’’ (1) if some individual in the beacon has the
allele and ‘‘no’’ (0) otherwise. By calculating the likelihood of the
responses, we can differentiate query individuals in the beacon
from those not in the beacon. Our approach for re-identifying in-
dividuals within a beacon is based on a LRT that uses this infor-
mation. For each query genome, we calculate the likelihood of
the beacon responses to n allele-presence queries under the null
hypothesis that a given individual is not in the beacon and the
alternative hypothesis that the given individual is in the beacon.
We then calculate the test statistic as the ratio of the two
likelihoods.
To make our LRT generalizable across populations, we will re-
move direct dependence on allele frequencies given that fre-
quencies can vary considerably for a given allele across popula-
tions. Instead, we will allow our test to depend on the shape of
the SFS, which is described by (a0, b0), the parameters of the beta
distribution. Although allele frequencies for a given allele can
vary considerably across populations, the SFS parameters for
most populations are similar to each other (Modeling SFSs by
Beta Distributions in Appendix A). Therefore, the results from a
test that depends on the shape of the SFS but is independent of
the actual allele frequencies can be generalized to many popula-
tions (Figure S1).
Our LRT evaluates the likelihood of the beacon response under
two possible hypotheses.
d Null hypothesis H0: query genome is not in the beacon data-
base.
d Alternative hypothesis H1: query genome is in the beacon
database.
LRT
In an ideal setting, we would expect x1 ¼ x2. ¼ xn ¼ 1 if a query
genome g is in the beacon B. In practice, because of sequencing er-
rors and differences in variant-calling pipelines, we might have
some mismatches between the query copy of a genome and its
copy in thebeacon.Weassume that thishappenswithprobability d.
Let the alternate allele frequency at the SNP corresponding to
query qi be fi. Because the beacon is only queried at the positions
where the query genome is heterozygous, fi is not distributed as be-
ta(a0, b0) but shows an ascertainment bias. We can show that fi ~
beta(a, b), where a ¼ a0 þ 1 and b ¼ b0 þ 1 in theory (Posterior Dis-
tribution of Allele Frequencies in Appendix A).632 The American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, NovembThe log-likelihood of a response set R¼ {x1,., xn} can be written
as
LðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0Þ: (Equation 1)
For the LRT, we need to evaluate this log-likelihood under the
null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. The null hypoth-
esis is that the query genome is not present in the beacon, and the
alternative hypothesis is that the query genome is present in the
beacon.
We can show that under the alternative hypothesis, the log-like-
lihood can be calculated as
LH1 ðRÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
xilogð1 dDN1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlogðdDN1Þ; (Equation 2)
whereDN  1 is the probability that none of N  1 genomes has an
alternate allele at a given position (see Likelihood under the Alter-
native Hypothesis in Appendix A).
Similarly, the log-likelihood under the null hypothesis is
LH0 ðRÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
xilogð1DNÞ þ ð1 xiÞlogðDNÞ (Equation 3)
(see Likelihood under the Null Hypothesis in Appendix A).
The log of the likelihood-ratio statistic can then be written as
L ¼ LH0 ðRÞ  LH1 ðRÞ
¼ nlog

DN
dDN1

þ log

dDN1ð1DNÞ
DNð1 dDN1Þ
X
i¼1
n
xi
¼ nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
xi;
where we have defined B ¼ logðDN=dDN1Þ and C ¼
logðdDN1ð1DNÞ=DNð1 dDN1ÞÞ (see LRT Statistic in Appendix
A). For d < ðDN=DN1Þ, we have C < 0. In practice, because
N[1, DNzDN1, and mismatch rate d  1, this will always
be true.
Therefore, the LRT statistic can be stated as
L ¼ nBþ C
Xn
i¼1
xi: (Equation 4)
The LRT stated above can be understood to be a test for a simple
null hypothesis H0: q ¼ 1  DN against a simple alternative hy-
pothesis H1: q ¼ 1  dDN when we are given {x1, ., xn} sampled
as xi ~ Bernoulli(q). By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, the LRT is
the most powerful test for a given test size a.Binomial Test
The null hypothesis is rejected if L < t for some threshold t. Let ta
be such that P(L < ta j H0) ¼ a. This is equivalent to rejecting the
null hypothesis if
Pn
i¼1xi > t
0
a, where t
0
a ¼ ðta  nB=CÞ.
Because the xi are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
under both hypotheses,
Pn
i¼1xi
H0  binomialðn;1DNÞ andPn
i¼1xi
H1  binomialðn;1 dDN1Þ. Therefore, the power of the
exact test can be calculated as 1 b ¼ PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H1Þ, where
t 0a is chosen such that Pð
Pn
i¼1xi > t
0
a
H0Þ ¼ a.
A sufficient statistic for the LRT is the number of ‘‘yes’’ responses
from the beacon.er 5, 2015
Relationship between the Number of Queries Required
and Beacon Size
In the null and alternative hypotheses, xi is a Bernoulli randomvar-
iable. Therefore, by the central limit theorem, the LRTstatistic has a
Gaussian distribution. We can therefore use the parameters of the
Gaussian distribution to obtain a relationship between the number
of queries (required for achieving a desired power and false-positive
rate) and the number of individuals in the beacon.
Let m0 and s0 be the mean and SD, respectively, of the LRT statis-
tic under the null hypothesis, and let m1 and s1 be the correspond-
ing values under the alternative hypothesis.
For an LRT statistic with false-positive rate a, power 1  b, and a
normal distribution, we have that
m0 þ s0za ¼ m1 þ s1z1b; (Equation 5)
where zy is the y quantile of the standard normal distribution.
For the LRT we describe, this relationship is equivalent to
n
Na0þ1
¼

za  z1b
ﬃﬃ
d
p 2
Gðb0 þ 1Þ2a0þ1
Gða0 þ b0 þ 2Þ (Equation 6)
(see Gaussian LRT Power Approximation in Appendix A). The
right-hand side of the equation is independent of both n and N
for a specified false-positive rate a and power 1  b. Thus, we
have that nfNa
0þ1.
LRT for Detecting Relatives
The relatedness of two individuals can be parameterized with a
single parameter f, which is the probability that the two individ-
uals share an allele at a single SNP. Thus, identical twins have f ¼
1, parent-offspring and sibling pairs have f ¼ 0.5, first cousins
have f ¼ 0.25, and so on.
The likelihood for the null hypothesis remains the same as
before. Under the alternate hypothesis (a relative of the query
genome g with relatedness f is present in beacon B), the log-likeli-
hood is given by
LH1 ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog

1 dDN1  ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN
 ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
	
þ ð1 xiÞlog

dDN1
þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN12
	
(Equation 7)
(see Likelihood under the Alternate Hypothesis in Appendix B).
We can use this form to calculate the LRTstatistic for this setting.
Here, the exact test uses
Pn
i¼1xi as the sufficient statistic (as before),
and the sufficient statistic is binomially distributed under both hy-
potheses. The distributions are given by
Pn
i¼1xi
H0 
binomialðn;1DNÞ and
Pn
i¼1xi
H1  binomialðn;1 dDN1
ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN  ð1 2dÞ fð1 fÞDNð1=2ÞÞ.
Therefore, the power of the exact test can be calculated as
b ¼ PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H1Þ, where t 0a is chosen such that
PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H0Þ ¼ a.
Simulation Experiments
We simulated 500,000 SNPs in a sample of 1,000 diploid individ-
uals. Alternate allele frequencies were sampled from amultinomial
distribution with probabilities obtained from the expected allele-
frequency distribution for a standard neutral model under the
assumption of a population size of 10,000 individuals.The AmericanWe constructed a beacon by using the 1,000 simulated individ-
uals. The query set of individuals consisted of
d 200 diploid individuals from the beacon
d 200 diploid individuals not in the beacon and whose geno-
types were simulated according to the generated allele fre-
quencies at all SNPs.
For initial experiments, the mismatch rate between the beacon
and query copies of the same genomes was set to 106 to simulate
near-ideal data.
The null distribution of the LRT statistic was obtained with the
exact-test calculation for the 200 individuals not in the beacon.
Power was calculated as the proportion of successfully rejected
tests (out of 200) for the query genomes in the beacon.
Detecting Relatives
To examine whether relatives could be identified from the beacon,
weused200 individuals fromthebeacon togeneratequerygenomes
with varying degrees of relatedness to the original individual.
Effect of Noise
Genome sequencing is more error prone than array genotyping.
Even with high-coverage data, biological replicates of the same in-
dividual could have 1%–5% SNPs unique to each replicate. On the
same sequenced sample, different variant-calling pipelines can
produce SNP calls at positions that might differ from each other.
Wemodel this in our simulation by allowing for a mismatch prob-
ability (d) that for a query individual who is in the beacon and is
heterozygous at the query SNP, the copy in the beacon is a homo-
zygous reference, i.e., the beacon will (erroneously) return 0 as the
response to the query. Table S2 shows the levels of mismatch
modeled in our experiments.
Experiments with Real Data
1000 Genomes Phase 1 CEU Beacon
We created a beacon by using the CEU population (Utah residents
with ancestry from northern and western Europe from the CEPH
collection) from phase 1 of the 1000 Genomes Project.8 Of the
85 CEU samples present in phase 1, 65 were used in the beacon.
20 samples from the beacon and the remaining 20 samples were
used as query genomes. Figure S4 shows the setup of the 1000 Ge-
nomes phase 1 CEU beacon.
To test the effect of censoring on power, we constructed a bea-
con by using the same data as above, except that the beacon al-
ways responded ‘‘no’’ to queries for singletons. We then used
whole genomes to query the beacon, as before.
To test whether sharing SNP array data was more secure than
sharing whole genomes, we repeated the setup of Figure S4 with
Affymetrix array data for the CEU samples. We then used SNP
array data to query the beacon.
Combining Multiple Datasets
We used the scheme of Figure S5 to create beacons that contained
either a single population (65 CEU individuals) or multiple popu-
lations (a CEU þ YRI [Yoruba in Ibadan, Nigeria] beacon with
32 CEU and 33 YRI individuals and a CEU þ JPT [Japanese in To-
kyo, Japan] beacon with 32 CEU and 33 JPT individuals). We used
40 CEU individuals as query individuals, 20 of whom belonged to
all beacons and 20 of whom belonged to none of the beacons.
Re-identifying a Personal Genome Project Individual
To test our method on existing beacons, we selected from the Per-
sonal Genome Project (PGP)9 a single genome (ID hu48C4EB orJournal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, November 5, 2015 633
Figure 1. Power of Re-identification Attacks on Beacons Constructed with Simulated Data
Power curves for the likelihood-ratio test (LRT) on (A) a simulated beacon with 1,000 individuals and (B) detecting relatives in the simu-
lated beacon. The false-positive rate was set to 0.05 for all scenarios.PGP 183).We chose 1,000 heterozygous SNPs from the selected in-
dividual’s genome and used the GA4GH Beacon Network query
interface to query all existing beacons for the alternate allele at
the chosen SNPs. If a beacon of size N produced k ‘‘yes’’ responses
to n queries, the p value was calculated under the null hypothesis
as PðxRk; x  binomialðn;1DNÞÞ.
Through metadata (see Web Resources), we were able to ascer-
tain that the selected individual was present in the PGP beacon
and the Kaviar10 beacon.Results
Re-identification in a Simulated Beacon
We validated our LRT framework by simulating a beacon
with 1,000 individuals and 500,000 total SNPs. From the
power curve (Figure 1A), we can see that the LRT had
more than 95% power to detect whether an individual
was in the beacon with just 5,000 SNP queries. We
also see that our theoretical analysis matches the empir-
ical results. For the same number of SNPs queried, the
power for detecting relatives was reduced but still consid-
erable (Figure 1B; Figure S2). Sequencing errors and
variant-calling differences reduced the power of the test
(Figure S3).
Re-identification in Phase 1 CEU Beacon
For evaluationwith real data,we set up a beaconbyusing 65
CEU individuals from phase 1 of the 1000 Genomes Proj-
ect8 (Figure S4). With just 250 SNPs, beacon membership
could be detected with 95% power and a 5% false-positive
rate (Figure 2A). A beacon constructed with the same
individuals but with SNP array data showed a reduction
in power, as did a beacon that used sequence data but
censored responses by always replying ‘‘no’’ to queries for
singletons (Figure 2B). Even in these scenarios, the LRT634 The American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, Novembhad greater than 90% power if 10,000 or more queries
were permitted.
Re-identification in Multi-population Beacon
Fromour theoretical analysis,we can see that increasingbea-
con size increases the number of SNPs required for achieving
a given power level at a specified threshold for the false-pos-
itive rate. Combining multiple datasets can make detection
more difficult in the same way. A question of interest is
whether combining multiple datasets can also make detec-
tion more difficult by affecting the SFS of the samples in
the beacon.
Figure 3 shows the power curves for beacons containing
multiple populations. The results show that for a fixed
number of SNPs to query, the power for the multi-popula-
tion beacons is higher than that for the CEU-only beacon.
A single-population beacon is therefore more secure than a
multi-population beacon of the same size. Because the pro-
tective effect of extra samples in the beacon against re-
identification depends on their allele sharing with the
query genome, including other populations in a beacon
is less effective than including the same number of individ-
uals from the population of the query genome.
Re-identification in Existing Beacons
We used our theoretical analysis to estimate the number of
queries our framework would require to re-identify individ-
uals and relatives from existing beacons. We used publicly
available beacon metadata to infer the number of individ-
uals present in the beacon. Where this was not possible
(the AMPlab, ICGC, and NCBI beacons), we used conserva-
tive estimates based on the size of the underlying datasets.
For SFS parameters, we used the estimates we obtained for
our simulation data. The Kaviar beacon contains 63,500
exomes and 8,400 whole genomes. Because exomes areer 5, 2015
Figure 2. Power of Re-identification Attacks on Beacons Constructed with Real Data
Power curves for the LRTon (A) a beacon constructed from 65 CEU individuals from 1000 Genomes phase 1 and (B) CEU beacons of size
65 and constructed with array data, censoredWGS data (without singletons), andWGS data. The false-positive rate was set to 0.05 for all
scenarios.only 1% of entire genomes in length, this beacon can be
assumed to consist of two beacons—an exome beacon
with 72,000 exomes and a genome beacon with 8,400
whole genomes. Re-identification is possible in the
genome beacon if queries for SNPs in the coding regions
are avoided. From Table 1, we see that only the Cafe Cardi-
oKit gene-panel beacon, the Broad Institute exome beacon,
and the Kaviar beacon are safe from our re-identification
attack, given that the gene panels and exomes have
much fewer SNPs than genomes. For all other beacons,
re-identification is possible with 95% power and fewer
than 50,000 allele queries. Thus, our approach is computa-
tionally feasible with existing beacons.Re-identifying a PGP Individual
We demonstrated the feasibility of re-identification in ex-
isting beacons by querying them 1,000 times with a sin-
gle genome from the PGP.9 To avoid overloading the bea-
con servers, we inserted a delay of 5 s between queries,
and all 1,000 queries were completed in 3 hr 53 min
from a single computer. In beacons where the presence
of the individual could be confirmed from metadata, we
obtained 100% ‘‘yes’’ responses (Table 2). The null hy-
pothesis (the query genome is not in the beacon) could
be rejected only for the PGP beacon (p ¼ 0.0033), but
not for the larger Kaviar beacon (p ¼ 0.98), demon-
strating that re-identification is more difficult in larger
beacons.Discussion
We have developed a LRT for identifying whether a given
individual genome is part of a beacon. Our experimentsThe Americanshow that in a variety of settings, detecting membership
in a beacon is possible with high power for not only indi-
viduals in the beacon but also their relatives. Because bea-
cons are often designed to share samples with a certain
phenotype, this also discloses phenotype information
about the individual who is detected to be part of the
beacon. Although detecting membership does not breach
privacy, disclosure of potentially sensitive phenotype in-
formation is a serious privacy breach. In Table 1, of the
nine beacons that index non-publically available genomic
data (see Table S3 for details of beacon datasets and pheno-
types), four are associated with a single phenotype (Cafe
CardioKit, ICGC, IBD, and SFARI beacons), four are associ-
ated with multiple phenotypes (Broad Institute, Kaviar,
NCBI, and UK10K beacons), and one is not associated
with any phenotype (Native American þ Egyptian bea-
con). For instance, identifying that a given genome is
part of the SFARI beacon, which contains genomic data
from families with a child affected by autism spectrum dis-
order, means that the individual belongs to a family where
some member has autism spectrum disorder. The LRT we
describe can be used in a number of undesirable ways.
For instance, a United States direct-to-consumer genetic-
testing company that collects genome-wide data from
customers could use it to infer phenotype or disease infor-
mation without their customers’ knowledge by querying
beacons.
Because the re-identification attack we describe re-
quires the attacker to have access to an individual’s
genome, an alternative is that the attacker can use
the query genome to directly predict disease risk by using
existing risk-prediction methods, such as genomic
risk scores11 or machine-learning methods.12 A com-
parison of the performance of risk prediction and theJournal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, November 5, 2015 635
Figure 3. Power of the LRT for Multi-population Datasets
Power is larger for multi-population beacons than for the CEU-
only beacon.re-identification LRT would be useful in understanding
whether re-identification discloses any extra information
about the query individual. However, most risk-predic-
tion methods focus on the risk that the subject will
develop the disease (in 10 years or at some future
time), whereas identifying beacon membership gives a
direct estimate of the probability that the queried indi-
vidual currently has the disease studied in the beacon
sample. A fair comparison of the two is therefore not
possible. If our LRT (with false-positive rate a ¼ 5%) iden-
tifies an individual as belonging to a case-only beacon
(i.e., rejects the null hypothesis) for a disease with popu-
lation prevalence (prior probability that an individual
has the disease) p ¼ 1%, the posterior probability that
the individual has the disease is given by (1  a) þ
ap ¼ 0.9505 according to Bayes’ theorem. For the same
result in a case-control beacon with equal numbers of
case and control individuals, the probability that the in-
dividual has the disease is given by 0.5 3 (1  a) þ
0.05p ¼ 0.4755. In contrast, although genomic risk pre-
diction has high success rates for Mendelian diseases
with highly penetrant alleles and in some cancers, the
success of such approaches for predicting common dis-
ease risk is modest.13 An upper bound on performing
genomic risk prediction by using an individual’s genome
can be obtained if one considers the (broad-sense) herita-
bility of the disease being studied. Polderman et al.14
examined the heritability of 17,804 human traits. From
their analysis, we can see that 26 out of 43 ICD-10
(International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision)
and ICF (International Classification of Functioning,
Disability, and Health) subchapter-level disease cate-
gories have heritability less than 50%, suggesting that636 The American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, Novembthe performance of genomic risk prediction for many dis-
ease categories will be limited.
Our approach makes some simplifying assumptions. We
assume that the beacon samples and the query genome
belong to the samepopulation. This is a reasonable assump-
tion given that beacons often publish the ethnicity of the
datasets included, whereas the ethnicity of the query
genomecanbe identifiedbycomparison to referencepanels
such as 1000 Genomes. Genotypes are assumed to be
distributed according to Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. We
also assume that allele queries are independent, which
can lead to overly confident predictions for common
SNPs. We expect that it will not affect our results signifi-
cantly, given that most SNPs are rare (<5% frequency) in
human populations. Inaccurate estimates of the shape of
the SFS can affect our theoretical analysis. However, as
Figure S1 shows for the theoretical power, the power of
the test is similar for populations with different SFS param-
eters, and Figure 2A shows good agreement between theo-
retical and empirical power curves on the CEU beacon. In
addition, the empirical power of the test does not depend
on the SFS parameters (Binomial Test in Appendix A). This
suggests that our test is robust to different SFS parameters.
A computational limitation is that establishing high confi-
dence might need millions of queries. In our experiments
with existing beacons, we were able to make 1,000 queries
to the beacon server in 3hr 53min,with a 5 s delay between
queries.
An important caveat is that the proposed LRT is only a
demonstration that individual privacy can be compro-
mised through beacons. It aims to show that beacon
membership can be identified with only the query
genome, even if allele frequencies are not known. As a
result, the bounds we obtain for the number of queries
required for re-identification (Table 1) are conservative
and should not be used directly to guide the construction
of beacons. A re-identification test that uses only rare
SNPs and/or incorporates the allele frequencies at SNPs
will be more powerful than our method and will require
fewer queries than our estimates. Because the LRT we
describe requires access to genomic data, such attacks
might not be frequent or imminent at this time. However,
as access to genomic data becomes easier, such attacks
might need to be accounted for in the design of data-
sharing mechanisms.
Our results have important implications for setting up
beacons to allow data sharing and protect individual
privacy. Beacons are designed to help researchers find
datasets relevant to their research interests (e.g., datasets
containing an allele that the researchers might suspect
to be associated with a rare Mendelian disorder). Access
to individual-level genotype data is usually controlled,6
and a researcher might spend considerable time and
effort applying for access only to find that the dataset is
not relevant to his or her study. An advantage of a
beacon is that any researcher can use it to query access-
controlled data without applying for access. This will allower 5, 2015
Table 1. Estimated Number of SNP Queries Required for Re-identification in Real Beacons with a 5% False-Positive Rate and 95% Power
Beacon Name Number of Samples
SNPs Required for Re-identification
Identical
Genomes
First-Degree
Relatives
Second-Degree
Relatives
1000 Genomes Project 1,092 3,649 34,467 157,861
1000 Genomes Project phase 3 2,535 8,469 79,976 366,276
AMPLab 2,535 8,469 79,976 366,276
Broad Institute 60,706 202,770 1,914,581 8,768,007
Cafe CardioKit 1,070 3,575 33,773 154,684
ICGC 12,807 42,779 403,936 1,849,878
Known VARiants 72,000 240,494 2,270,772 10,399,218
Known VARiants (genomes only) 8,400 28,059 264,947 1,213,368
NCBI 14,466 48,320 456,258 2,089,490
PGP 174 582 5,515 25,273
IBD 5,070 16,936 159,926 732,410
Native American þ Egyptian 100 335 3,181 14,586
UK10K 6,322 21,118 199,411 913,239
SFARI 10,400 34,739 328,024 1,502,231researchers to establish whether an access-controlled data-
set might be of interest to them and apply for access only
for relevant datasets. Two desirable features in beacons
might therefore be that they contain a single dataset (so re-
searchers who find a relevant dataset by querying a beacon
can get data access through a single request) and that they
return accurate information about the presence of rare
alleles. Solutions for protecting privacy in beacons must
also maintain the utility of beacons by supporting these
features. We examine two ways in which security can be
improved for anonymous-access beacons: (1) makingTable 2. Theoretical p Values for 1,000 Queries for SNPs from a
Genome in the Personal Genome Project
Beacon Name Beacon Size ‘‘Yes’’ Responses p Value
Known VARiantsa 72,000 1000 0.98
Broad Institute 60,706 27 1
1000 Genomes Project 1,092 711 1
PGPa 174 1000 0.0033
Cafe CardioKit 1,070 0 1
Wellcome Trust
Sanger Institute
11,492 960 1
NCBI 14,466 947 1
ICGC 12,807 134 1
AMPLab 2,535 946 1
1000 Genomes
Project phase 3
2,535 946 1
aBeacons known to contain the individual (from metadata).
The Americandetection of membership in the beacon harder and (2)
reducing the leakage of phenotype information from the
beacon.
A number of approaches can be used for making detec-
tion of membership in the beacon harder. Increasing bea-
con size can make detection harder, but protection against
genome-wide re-identification attacks will require tens of
thousands of individuals. Beacons sharing small genomic
regions (single genes or exomes) are more secure than
those sharing whole genomes. Beacons containing multi-
ple populations are less secure than single-population bea-
cons of the same size. Publishing metadata—such as the
ethnicity of samples, beacon size, or the names of datasets
included—reduces beacon security. Limiting the number
and/or rate of queries per IP address can only slow down
attackers and is therefore ineffective. Data-anonymiza-
tion15 approaches, such as using only common variation
or censoring (Figure 2B; Censoring Beacon Responses in
Appendix B), make re-identification harder but not impos-
sible. All of these methods make detection of membership
in the beacon harder, but they also reduce the utility of
beacons to users.
An alternative way of improving beacon security is to
address the leakage of phenotype information instead of
the possibility of genomic re-identification. As described
earlier, the probability that a re-identified sample has the
disease associated with the beacon dataset depends on
the proportion of case samples in the beacon dataset.
Therefore, adding a suitable number of control samples
or aggregating responses from multiple beacons (imple-
mented as an option in the Beacon Network) might reduce
the probability that a re-identified sample has the disease toJournal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, November 5, 2015 637
an acceptable level. Heritability estimates can be used for
determining an acceptable probability level for a particular
disease. By including non-case samples, these solutions
reduce the phenotype information that can be obtained
from a beacon while keeping the reduction in the utility
of the beacon to a minimum.
We expect that, because of the lack of monitoring and
access control, anonymous-access beacons will always be
open to re-identification attempts. The most important
step for improving security and reducing loss of privacy
through beacons would be to prohibit anonymous access.
Requiring users to authenticate their identity to access bea-
cons will allow the research community to discourage re-
identification attacks through policies outlining accept-
able uses of beacons.16Appendix A: LRT
In an ideal setting, we would expect x1 ¼ x2. ¼ xn ¼ 1 if a
query genome g is in the beacon B. In practice, because of
sequencing errors and differences in variant-calling pipe-
lines, we might have some mismatches between the query
copy of a genome and its copy in the beacon. We assume
that this happens with probability d.
Let the alternate allele frequency at the SNP correspond-
ing to query qi be fi. Because the beacon is only queried at
the positions where the query genome is heterozygous, fi is
not distributed as beta(a0, b0) but shows an ascertainment
bias. We can show that fi ~ beta(a, b), where a ¼ a0 þ 1
and b¼ b0 þ 1 in theory (see Posterior Distribution of Allele
Frequencies in Appendix A for details).
The log-likelihood of a response set R¼ {x1,., xn} can be
written as
LðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0Þ:
(Equation A1)
For the LRT, we need to evaluate this log-likelihood un-
der the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis.
The null hypothesis is that the query genome is not pre-
sent in the beacon, and the alternative hypothesis is that
the query genome is present in the beacon.
Likelihood under the Alternative Hypothesis
Under the alternative hypothesis (query genome g is pre-
sent in beacon B, g ˛B), the response xi is given by
I. xi ¼ 1 if638(a) there is no mismatch between the query genome
and its copy in the beacon or
(b) there is a mismatch between the query genome
and its copy in the beacon but at least one of
the other N  1 genomes in the beacon has the
alternate allele.
II. xi ¼ 0 if there is a mismatch between the query
genome and its copy in the beacon and none ofThe American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, November 5the other N 1 genomes in the beacon has the alter-
nate allele.The log-likelihood under the alternative hypothesis is
given by
LH1ðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ
þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ: (Equation A2)
We first calculate Pðxi ¼ 0 jH1Þ:
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼ Pðxi ¼ 0 j g ˛BÞ
¼ Pðxi ¼ 0 j g ˛B;mismatchÞ3 PðmismatchÞ
3Pðnone of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate alleleÞ
¼ 13 d3 Pðnone of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate alleleÞ
¼ d
Z 1
fi¼0
P

none of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate allele j fi

P

fi

dfi
¼ d
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2	ðN1Þ
P

fi

dfi
¼ d
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N2
P

fi; a; b

dfi
¼ d
Z 0
pi¼1
p2N2i P

pi; b; a
dpi fi  betaða; bÞ5
pi ¼ 1 fi  betaðb; aÞ
¼ d3E
p2N2i  pi  betaðb; aÞ
¼ d Q
r¼0
2N21 bþ r
bþ aþ r
¼ d Q
r¼0
2N3 bþ r
bþ aþ r:
Let DN1 ¼
Q2N3
r¼0 ðbþ r=bþ aþ rÞ. DN1 is therefore the
probability that none of N  1 genomes has an alternate
allele.
Therefore, we have that
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼ dDN1 (Equation A3)
and
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ ¼ 1 dDN1: (Equation A4)
The log-likelihood can be calculated as, 2015
LH1ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ
¼
X
i¼1
n
xilogð1 dDN1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlogðdDN1Þ:
Likelihood under the Null Hypothesis
Under the null hypothesis (query genome g is not in bea-
con B, g;B), the response xi is given byI. xi ¼ 1 if at least one of the N genomes in the beacon
contains the alternate allele.
II. xi ¼ 0 if none of the N genomes in the beacon con-
tains the alternate allele.The log-likelihood under the null hypothesis is
given by
LH0ðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ
þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ: (Equation A5)
We first calculate Pðxi ¼ 0 jH0Þ:
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ ¼ Pðxi ¼ 0 j g;BÞ
¼ Pðnone of the N genomes has the alternate alleleÞ
¼ DN ; from our earlier definition:
Therefore, we have that
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ ¼ DN (Equation A6)
and
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ ¼ 1DN : (Equation A7)
The log-likelihood can be calculated as
LH0ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ
¼
X
i¼1
n
xilogð1DNÞ þ ð1 xiÞlogðDNÞ:
Thus, the log-likelihood under the null hypothesis is
LH0ðRÞ ¼
Xn
i¼1
xilogð1DNÞ þ ð1 xiÞlogðDNÞ:
(Equation A8)
LRT Statistic
The log of the likelihood-ratio statistic can then be writ-
ten asThe AmericanL ¼ LH0ðRÞ  LH1ðRÞ
¼
X
i¼1
n
xilogð1DNÞ þ ð1 xiÞlogðDNÞ

hX
i¼1
n
xilogð1 dDN1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlogðdDN1Þ
i
¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog

1DN
1 dDN1

þ ð1 xiÞlog

DN
dDN1

¼ nlog

DN
dDN1

þ
X
i¼1
n
xi

log

1DN
1 dDN1

 log

DN
dDN1

¼ nlog

DN
dDN1

þ
X
i¼1
n
xilog

dDN1ð1DNÞ
DNð1 dDN1Þ

¼ nlog

DN
dDN1

þ log

dDN1ð1DNÞ
DNð1 dDN1Þ
X
i¼1
n
xi
¼ nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
xi;
where we have defined B ¼ logðDN=dDN1Þ and
C¼ logðdDN1ð1DNÞ=DNð1dDN1ÞÞ. For d < ðDN=DN1Þ,
we have C < 0. In practice, because N[1, DNzDN1,
and mismatch rate d  1, this will always be true.
Therefore, the LRT statistic can be stated as
L ¼ nBþ C
Xn
i¼1
xi: (Equation A9)
Neyman-Pearson Optimality of LRT
The LRT stated above can be understood to be a test for
a simple null hypothesis H0: q ¼ DN against a simple
alternative hypothesis H1: q ¼ dDN  1 when we are given
{x1, ., xn} sampled as xi ~ Bernoulli(q). By the Neyman-
Pearson lemma, the LRT is the most powerful test for a
given test size a.
Binomial Test
The null hypothesis is rejected ifL< t for some threshold t.
Let ta be such that P(L < ta j H0) ¼ a.
This is equivalent to
PðL < ta j H0Þ ¼ a (Equation A10)
P
 
nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
xi < ta j H0
!
¼ a (Equation A11)
P
 
C
X
i¼1
n
xi < ta  nB j H0
!
¼ a (Equation A12)
P
 X
i¼1
n
xi >
ta  nB
C
j H0
!
¼ a; because C < 0
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 Xn ! ta  nB
P
i¼1
xi > t
0
a j H0 ¼ a; where t 0a ¼ C :
(Equation A14)
Because the xi are i.i.d. under both hypotheses,Pn
i¼1xi
H0  binomialðn;1DNÞ and Pni¼1xi H1 
binomialðn;1 dDN1Þ. Therefore, the power of the exact
test can be calculated as 1 b ¼ PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H1Þ, where
t 0a is chosen such that Pð
Pn
i¼1xi > t
0
a
H0Þ ¼ a.
Thus, a sufficient statistic for the LRT is the number of
‘‘yes’’ responses from the beacon. If a ‘‘truth set’’ of individ-
uals known to be (or not be) in the beacon is available, the
critical value and power of the test can be computed with
only the number of ‘‘yes’’ responses from the beacon. Thus,
the empirical power is not dependent on the SFS parame-
ters, which suggests that the test is robust to SFS
parameters.
Gaussian LRT Power Approximation
In the null and alternative hypotheses, xi is a Bernoulli
random variable. Therefore, by the central limit theorem,
the LRT statistic has a Gaussian distribution. We can there-
fore use the parameters of the Gaussian distribution to
obtain a relationship between the false-positive rate and
power of the test.
Let m0 and s0 be the mean and SD, respectively, of
the LRT statistic under the null hypothesis, and let m1
and s1 be the corresponding values under the alternative
hypothesis.
From earlier results, we have that
m0 ¼ E½L j H0 (Equation A15)
¼ nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
E½xi j H0 (Equation A16)
¼ nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ (Equation A17)
¼ nBþ C
X
i¼1
n
ð1DNÞ (Equation A18)
¼ nBþ nCð1DNÞ (Equation A19)
and
s20 ¼ Var½L j H0 (Equation A20)
¼ C2
X
i¼1
n
Var½xi j H0 (Equation A21)
¼ C2
X
i¼1
n
DNð1DNÞ (Equation A22)
¼ C2nDNð1DNÞ (Equation A23)640 The American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, Novembs0 ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nDNð1DNÞ
p
; (Equation A24)
where we have chosen the square root ofC2, which is larger
than 0 (because C < 0).
Similarly, we can show that
m1 ¼ nBþ nCð1 dDN1Þ (Equation A25)
and
s1 ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p
: (Equation A26)
For an LRT statistic with false-positive rate a, power 1 b,
and a normal distribution, we have that
m0 þ s0za ¼ m1 þ s1z1b; (Equation A27)
where zy is the y quantile of the standard normaldistribution.
Substituting from above, we get
m0 þ s0za ¼ m1 þ s1z1b (Equation A28)
m0  m1 ¼ s1z1b  s0za: (Equation A29)
We have
m0  m1 ¼ nBþ nCð1DNÞ  ½nBþ nCð1 dDN1Þ
(Equation A30)
¼ nCðdDN1 DNÞ: (Equation A31)
Also,
s1z1b  s0za ¼ z1bC
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p
þzaC
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nDNð1DNÞ
p
¼ C ﬃﬃﬃnp za ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃDNð1DNÞp
z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p 
:
Therefore, we get
m0  m1 ¼ s1z1b  s0za (Equation A32)
nCðdDN1 DNÞ ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p 
za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
DNð1DNÞ
p
 z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p 
(Equation A33)
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðdDN1 DNÞ ¼ za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
DNð1DNÞ
p
 z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p
:
(Equation A34)
Thus, for a given false-positive rate a, the number of
SNPs that must be queried for obtaining power 1  b is
given as
n ¼
 
za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
DNð1DNÞ
p  z1b ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃdDN1ð1 dDN1Þp
dDN1 DN
!2
:
(Equation A35)er 5, 2015
Also, given a number of SNPs n and a false-positive rate a,
the power that will be achieved is
1 b ¼ F1
 
za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
DNð1DNÞ
p  ﬃﬃﬃnp ðdDN1 DNÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dDN1ð1 dDN1Þ
p
!
;
(Equation A36)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution Nð0;1Þ.
We can show that DN can be approximated as
D ¼ DNzDN1z Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞð2N þ aþ bÞa (Equation A37)
(see Approximating Probability of No Alternate Alleles in
Appendix A).
For N[1, given that D < 1 and d  1, we assume
1Dz1, 1 dDz1, and 1 dz1. Also, because
N[ a; b, we assume 2N þ aþ bz2N. Then, we can write
n
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞð2NÞaz

za  z1b
ﬃﬃ
d
p 	2
n
Na
¼

za  z1b
ﬃﬃ
d
p 	2
GðbÞ2a
Gðaþ bÞ :
In terms of the SFS of the entire population, we can write
this as
n
Na0þ1
¼

za  z1b
ﬃﬃ
d
p 2
Gðb0 þ 1Þ2a0þ1
Gða0 þ b0 þ 2Þ : (Equation A38)
The right-hand side of the equation is independent of both
n andN for a specified false-positive rate a and power 1 b.
Thus, we have that nfNa
0þ1.
Modeling SFSs by Beta Distributions
We model alternate allele frequencies for populations by
beta distributions similarly to the approaches used by San-
kararaman et al.2 and Clayton.5 If ff1;/; fng are distributed
as betaða0; b0Þ, then the sample mean and variance, respec-
tively, are given by
f ¼
Pn
i¼1fi
n
(Equation A39)
and
v ¼
Pn
i¼1

fi  f
2
n 1 : (Equation A40)
The method-of-moments estimators for the parameters of
the beta distribution are
a0 ¼ f
 
f

1 f 
v
 1
!
(Equation A41)
and
b0 ¼ 1 f 
 
f

1 f 
v
 1
!
(Equation A42)
provided that v < f ð1 f Þ.The AmericanTable S1 shows that the estimates of the SFS parameters
for simulated data and some public datasets (1000 Ge-
nomes, SSMP,17 and GoNL18) are similar to each other.
Figure S1 shows the effect of different estimates of SFS pa-
rameters for the populations in Table S1 on the theoretical
power of the LRT. We see that estimates of SFS parameters
affect the theoretical predictions, although results remain
qualitatively similar. The test has the least power for SNP
array data given that it has relatively less rare variation.
Posterior Distribution of Allele Frequencies
According to the SFS of the population, the alternate allele
frequency f at a SNP is distributed as f  betaða0; b0Þ. If we
assume Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and f is the frequency
observed at a SNP where the query genome is heterozygous
(gt¼ 1), the posterior distribution of f at the SNP is given by
Bayes’ rule as
Pðf j gt ¼ 1Þ ¼ Pðgt ¼ 1 j f ÞPðf ÞR 1
f 0¼0 Pðgt ¼ 1 j f 0ÞPðf Þdf 0
(Equation A43)
¼
2f ð1 f Þ Gða
0 þ b0Þ
Gða0ÞGðb0Þ f
a01ð1 f Þb01
R 1
f 0¼0 2f
0ð1 f 0Þ Gða
0 þ b0Þ
Gða0ÞGðb0Þf
0a01ð1 f 0Þb01df 0
(Equation A44)
¼ f
a0þ11ð1 f Þb0þ11R 1
f 0¼0 f
0a0þ11ð1 f 0Þb0þ11df 0
(Equation A45)
¼ Gða
0 þ b0 þ 2Þ
Gða0 þ 1ÞGðb0 þ 1Þf
a0þ11ð1 f Þb0þ11 (Equation A46)
¼ betaða0 þ 1; b0 þ 1Þ: (Equation A47)
Therefore, the posterior distribution of the alternate
allele frequency f at heterozygous sites is given as f ~ beta(a,
b), where a ¼ a0 þ 1 and b ¼ b0 þ 1. In practice, for both
simulated and real genomic data, the observed values of
the parameters of the posterior distribution are slightly
different from their expectations. In the theoretical power
curves for our analyses, we use the correct estimated values
of the parameters for the simulated data rather than the
theoretical expectation or estimates from real data.
Approximating Probability of No Alternate Alleles
We have defined DN ¼
Q2N1
r¼0 ððbþ rÞ=ðbþ aþ rÞÞ as the
probability that none of N individuals has an alternate
allele. Here, we show that
D ¼ DNz Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞð2N þ aþ bÞa: (Equation A48)
For this result, we use Stirling’s approximation to the
Gamma function, given by
GðxÞz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
x
r x
e
	x
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We use the result that for y/N,
ð1 1=yÞyz1
e
: (Equation A50)
We also assume that N[ a; b and N[1.
We have
DN ¼
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N
P

fi; a; b

dfi (Equation A51)
¼
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N Gðaþ bÞ
GðaÞGðbÞf
a1
i

1 fi
b1
dfi (Equation A52)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðaÞGðbÞ
Z 1
fi¼0
f a1i

1 fi
2Nþb1
dfi (Equation A53)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðaÞGðbÞ3
GðaÞGðbþ 2NÞ
Gðaþ bþ 2NÞ (Equation A54)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ 3
Gðbþ 2NÞ
Gðaþ bþ 2NÞ (Equation A55)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
bþ 2N
r 
bþ 2N
e
bþ2N
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aþ bþ 2N
2p
r  e
aþ bþ 2N
	aþbþ2N (Equation A56)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aþ bþ 2N
bþ 2N
r
ea

bþ 2N
aþ bþ 2N
bþ2N
1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A57)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ

1þ a
bþ2N
	0:5
ea

bþ 2N
aþ bþ2N
bþ2N
1
aþbþ2N
a
:
(Equation A58)
Given that a=ðbþ 2NÞ  1, we can simplify this expres-
sion further as
DN ¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ

1þ a
bþ 2N
	0:5
3 ea

bþ 2N
aþ bþ 2N
bþ2N
1
aþ bþ 2N
a (Equation A59)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ

1þ a
2ðbþ 2NÞ

3 ea

bþ 2N
aþ bþ 2N
bþ2N
1
aþ bþ 2N
a (Equation A60)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ 313 e
a

bþ 2N
aþ bþ 2N
bþ2N
1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A61)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ e
a

1 a
aþ bþ 2N
	bþ2N 1
aþ bþ 2N
a
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 a 	aþbþ2Na aðbþ2NÞaþbþ2N 1 a¼
GðbÞ e
a 1
aþ bþ 2N aþ bþ 2N
(Equation A63)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ e
a

1
e
aðbþ2NÞ
aþbþ2N

1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A64)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ e
aaðbþ2NÞ
aþbþ2N

1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A65)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ e
a

1 bþ2N
aþbþ2N

1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A66)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ e
að11Þ

1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A67)
¼ Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞ 313

1
aþ bþ 2N
a
(Equation A68)
z
Gðaþ bÞ
GðbÞðaþ bþ 2NÞa (Equation A69)Appendix B: LRT Variations
We consider variations of the likelihood test to detect rela-
tives and to examine the effect of censoring the SFS on the
power of the test.
LRT for Detecting Relatives
The relatedness of two individuals can be parameterized
with a single parameter f, which is the probability that
the two individuals share an allele at a single SNP. Thus,
identical twins have f ¼ 1, parent-offspring and sibling
pairs have f ¼ 0.5, first cousins have f ¼ 0.25 and so on.
The likelihood for the null hypothesis remains the same
as before. Below, we show the likelihood computation for
the alternate hypothesis
Likelihood under the Alternate Hypothesis
Under the alternate hypothesis (a relative of the query
genome g with relatedness f is present in beacon B), the
response xi is given by
I. xi ¼ 0 if none of the other N  1 genomes in the bea-
con has the alternate allele and(a) there is no mismatch between the query genome
and its copy in the beacon and the relative is a
homozygous reference at the SNP or
(b) there is a mismatch between the query genome
and its copy in the beacon and the relative is
not a homozygous reference at the SNP.
II. xi ¼ 1 otherwise.
For an individual who is heterozygous at a SNP with
alternate allele frequency f, the genotype probabilities for
a relative with relatedness f can be shown to beer 5, 2015
Pðgtrelative ¼ 0 j gt ¼ 1; f Þ ¼ ð1 fÞ2ð1 f Þ2
þfð1 fÞð1 f Þ;
Pðgtrelative ¼ 1 j gt ¼ 1; f Þ ¼ 2ð1 fÞ2f ð1 f Þ
þfð1 fÞ þ f2; and
Pðgtrelative ¼ 2 j gt ¼ 1; f Þ ¼ ð1 fÞ2f 2 þ fð1 fÞf ;
(Equation B1)
where gt and gtrelative are the genotypes of the individual
and the relative, respectively, at the SNP.
The log-likelihood under the alternate hypothesis is
given by
LH1ðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ
þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ: (Equation B2)
We first calculate Pðxi ¼ 0 jH1Þ:
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼ Pðxi ¼ 0 j relative˛BÞ
¼ Pðnone of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate alleleÞ3 ½dPðgtrelative > 0 j gt ¼ 1Þ
þ ð1 dÞPðgtrelative ¼ 0 j gt ¼ 1Þ
¼
Z 1
fi¼0
P

none of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate allele j fi

3


dP

gtrelative > 0 j gt ¼ 1; fi

þ ð1 dÞPgtrelative ¼ 0 j gt ¼ 1; fiPfidfi
¼
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N1

dP

gtrelative > 0 j gt ¼ 1; fi

þ ð1 dÞPgtrelative ¼ 0 j gt ¼ 1; fiPfidfi
¼
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N2h
d

1 ð1 fÞ2ð1 f Þ2
 fð1 fÞð1 f Þ
	
þ ð1 dÞ

ð1 fÞ2ð1 f Þ2
þ fð1 fÞð1 f Þ
	i
P

fi

dfi
¼
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N2h
dþ ð1 2dÞ

ð1 fÞ21 fi2
þ fð1 fÞ1 fi	iPfidfi
¼
Z 1
fi¼0
d

1 fi
2N2
P

fi

dfi
þ
Z 1
fi¼0
ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ21 fi2NPfidfi
þ
Z 1
fi¼0
ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞ1 fi2N1Pfidfi
¼ d
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N2
P

fi

dfi
þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N
P

fi

dfi
þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞ
Z 1
fi¼0

1 fi
2N1
P

fi

dfi
¼ dDN1 þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
¼ dDN1 þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
:The AmericanFor f ¼ 1, this expression collapses to the form of Equa-
tion A3.
Therefore, we have that
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼ dDN1 þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN
þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
(Equation B3)
and
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ ¼ 1 dDN1  ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN
 ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
:
(Equation B4)
Thus, the log-likelihood under the alternate hypothesis is
LH1ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog

1 dDN1  ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN
 ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN12
	
þ ð1 xiÞlog

dDN1
þ ð1 2dÞð1 fÞ2DN þ ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDN1
2
	
:
(Equation B5)
We can use this form to calculate the LRT statistic.
Here, the exact test uses
Pn
i¼1xi as the sufficient sta-
tistic (as before), and the sufficient statistic is bino-
mially distributed under both hypotheses. The dis-
tributions are given by
Pn
i¼1xi
H0  binomialðn;1DNÞ
and
Pn
i¼1xi
H1  binomialðn;1 dDN1  ð1 2dÞð1
fÞ2DN  ð1 2dÞfð1 fÞDNð1=2ÞÞ.
Therefore, the power of the exact test can be calculated
as b ¼ PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H1Þ, where t 0a is chosen such that
PðPni¼1xi > t 0a H0Þ ¼ a.
Censoring Beacon Responses
One solution to the re-identification problem is to return
accurate responses only for common variants. We consider
a setting where the beacon chooses a threshold frequency
f * and returns ‘‘no’’ responses to queries for alleles that
have frequency less than or equal to f * in the population
(not necessarily in the beacon samples). For alleles at fre-
quency larger than f *, the beacon will return the true
answer.Likelihood under the Alternative Hypothesis
Under the alternative hypothesis (query genome g is pre-
sent in beacon B, g ˛B), the response xi is given by
I. xi ¼ 0 ifJo(a) the frequency of the allele fi % f *or
(b) the frequency of the allele fi > f * and there is a
mismatch between the query genome and its
copy in the beacon and none of the other
N  1 genomes in the beacon has the alternate
allele.
II. xi ¼ 1 otherwise.urnal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, November 5, 2015 643
The log-likelihood under the alternative hypothesis is
given by
LH1ðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ
þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ: (Equation B6)
We first calculate Pðxi ¼ 0 jH1Þ:
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼
Z f 
fi¼0
P

fi

dfi
þ
Z 1
fi¼f 
dP

none of the other N  1 genomes has the
alternate allele j fi

P

fi

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þ d
Z 1
fi¼f 

1 fi
2	ðN1Þ
P

fi

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þ d
Z 1
fi¼f 

1 fi
2N2
P

fi; a; b

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þ dDN1

1 If  ða; bþ 2N  2Þ

¼ EN1;
where EN1 ¼ If  ða; bÞ þ dDN1ð1 If  ða; bþ 2N  2ÞÞ.
Here, Ix(a, b) is the cumulative distribution function for a
beta distribution with shape parameters a and b, evaluated
at value x.
Therefore, we have that
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ ¼ EN1 (Equation B7)
and
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ ¼ 1 EN1: (Equation B8)
The log-likelihood can be calculated as
LH1ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H1Þ
¼P
i¼1
n
xilogð1 EN1Þ þ ð1 xiÞlogðEN1Þ:
Likelihood under the Null Hypothesis
Under the null hypothesis (query genome g is not in
beacon B, g;B), the response xi is given by
I. xi ¼ 0 if
(a) the frequency of the allele fi % f *or
(b) the frequency of the allele fi> f * and none of the
other N genomes in the beacon has the alternate
allele.
II. xi ¼ 1 otherwise.
The log-likelihood under the null hypothesis is given by
LH0ðRÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ
þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ: (Equation B9)644 The American Journal of Human Genetics 97, 631–646, NovembWe first calculate Pðxi ¼ 0 jH0Þ:
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ ¼
Z f 
fi¼0
P

fi

dfi
þ
Z 1
fi¼f 
P

none of the other N genomes has the
alternate allele j fi

P

fi

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þ
Z 1
fi¼f 

1 fi
2	N
P

fi

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þ
Z 1
fi¼f 

1 fi
2N
P

fi; a; b

dfi
¼ If  ða; bÞ þDN

1 If  ða; bþ 2NÞ
¼ FN ;
where FN ¼ If  ða; bÞ þDNð1 If  ða; bþ 2NÞÞ.
Therefore, we have that
Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ ¼ FN (Equation B10)
and
Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ ¼ 1 FN : (Equation B11)
The log-likelihood can be calculated as
LH0ðRÞ ¼
X
i¼1
n
xilog Pðxi ¼ 1 j H0Þ þ ð1 xiÞlog Pðxi ¼ 0 j H0Þ
¼P
i¼1
n
xilogð1 FNÞ þ ð1 xiÞlogðFNÞ:
Finding the Optimal Censoring Threshold f *
We use the Gaussian approximation described earlier to
obtain an estimate of the optimal censoring threshold fre-
quency f*. We have that
m1 ¼ nBþ nCð1 EN1Þ; (Equation B12)
s1 ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nEN1ð1 EN1Þ
p
; (Equation B13)
m0 ¼ nBþ nCð1 FNÞ; (Equation B14)
and
s0 ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nFNð1 FNÞ
p
: (Equation B15)
We have
m0  m1 ¼ nBþ nCð1 FNÞ  ½nBþ nCð1 EN1Þ
(Equation B16)
¼ nCðEN1  FNÞ: (Equation B17)
Also,
s1z1b  s0za ¼ z1bC
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nEN1ð1 EN1Þ
p
þ zaC
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nFNð1 FNÞ
p
¼ C ﬃﬃﬃnp za ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃFNð1 FNÞp
 z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
EN1ð1 EN1Þ
p 	
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Therefore, we get
m0  m1 ¼ s1z1b  s0za (Equation B18)
nCðEN1  FNÞ ¼ C
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p 
za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
FNð1 FNÞ
p
 z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
EN1ð1 EN1Þ
p 	
(Equation B19)
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p ðEN1  FNÞ ¼ za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
FNð1 FNÞ
p
 z1b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
EN1ð1 EN1Þ
p
(Equation B20)
1 b ¼ F1
 
za
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
FNð1 FNÞ
p  ﬃﬃﬃnp ðEN1  FNÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
EN1ð1 EN1Þ
p
!
:
(Equation B21)
All terms in this equation depend on f *, n, N, a, b, a,
and b. Thus, while allowing n queries given a desired
false-positive rate a and maximum allowable power 1  b
in a beacon with N individuals from a population with
SFS parametrized by betaða 1; b 1Þ, we can find the
censoring threshold f *. An analytical solution cannot be
obtained for f * because of the form of the cumulative
distribution function. However, a grid search over f * can
be used for finding the optimal value for the censoring
threshold.Supplemental Data
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